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Death with Dignity and the Terminally Ill:

The Need for Legislative Action
Satz v. Perlmutter

The advances in the field of medical science during the past several
decades have been significant. The benefits society has received from
those medical advances are not, however, without serious consequences.' Today, with the physician's vast array of weapons to combat
sickness and death, terminally ill patients who no longer wish to live,
but who desire a natural death with dignity, may have their lives artificially prolonged for months or even years.2 There is growing national
concern over the use of advanced medical technology to artificially prolong the lives of terminally ill patients. These concerns are echoed by
the patient who expresses a desire to face death on his own terms; the
health care profession who must provide medical facilities and treat the
terminally ill patient; family members who are exposed to an emotional and financial strain; and the state which has an interest in the
preservation of life and the protection of other aspects of our society.
Recently, the Florida judiciary was faced with balancing the interests of the state against the rights of the individual to refuse extraordinary medical treatment. Abe Perlmutter, a retired New York taxi cab
driver, was diagnosed in January, 1977 as suffering from amyotrophic
lateral sclerosis, a condition more commonly known as "Lou Gehrig's
disease." 3 This illness is progressive with life expectancy being approximately two years from the time of diagnosis.' Prior to his affliction,
Mr. Perlmutter was active in community affairs and enjoyed his retireI.

Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So.2d 160, 162 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).

2. Friedman, Rejection of ExtraordinaryMedical Care By A Terminal Patient:
A Proposed Living Will Statute, 64 IowA L. REv. 573, 576, 577 (1979). [hereinafter

cited as Friedman].
3. Miami Herald, Jan. 18, 1980, § A at 1. Amyotropic lateral sclerosis "is a
disease of the nervous system in which, as a result of degeneration of nerve cells in the

spine and brain, there is a progressive wasting of the muscles of the body, with spastic
paralysis." BLACK'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 37 (31st ed. 1976).
4. 362 So.2d at 161.
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ment in Lauderdale Lakes, Florida.5 In May, 1978, his condition had
deteriorated to the extent that extraordinary medical treatment was required to prolong his life. Even with the mechanical respirator attached
to a breathing hole in his trachea, death was expected within a short
period of time.' In addition to the respirator, Mr. Perlmutter required
a private hospital room, the continuous presence of skilled care, and
constant attention from doctors and other hospital staff members.7 On
more than one occasion, Mr. Perlmutter attempted to remove the respirator. His attempts were thwarted by hospital and medical personnel
who were alerted by the sounding of an alarm.8
Mr. Perlmutter filed a complaint in Broward County Circuit
Court asking that he be given the right to determine whether to continue the extraordinary medical treatment that was artificially prolonging his life.? On July 11, 1978, Judge Ferris granted Mr. Perlmutter's
request. 0 The decision was immediately appealed to the District Court

of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District, which on September 13, 1978,
affirmed the circuit court order granting Mr. Perlmutter's right to refuse life-prolonging medical treatment." On October 4, 1978,'1 Mr.
Perlmutter called his family to his bedside. 3 His son unplugged the
5. Mr. Perlmutter ". . . was described as a physical fitness advocate who
shunned junk food and led an exercise class at his condominium." Fort Lauderdale
News, Jan. 17, 1980, § A at 7.
6. Perlmutter v. Florida Medical Center, Inc., 47 Fla. Supp. 190, 191, 192 (Cir.
Ct. 1978).
7. Id. at 192.
8. Id. Additionally, in his complaint, Mr. Perlmutter alleged that the hospital
placed restraints upon his hands and arms to prevent his continued attempts to remove
the respirator. See complaint. 47 Fla. Supp. 190.
9. Case number 78-9747, filed June 8, 1978, in the 17th Judicial Circuit, in and
for Broward County, Florida.
10. 47 Fla. Supp. 190. The judge rendered his decision after conducting a bedside
hearing with Mr. Perlmutter at Florida Medical Center. During this hearing, Mr. Perlmutter told Judge Ferris that he would prefer to lead a normal life, but absent this
possibility, death as a result of the removal of his respirator, could not "...
be worse
than what I'm going through now." 362 So.2d at 161.
11. Id. at 160.
12. A petition for rehearing was denied on September 27, 1978, as well as a
motion to withhold mandate and extend the stay pending Florida Supreme Court review. The Fourth District Court of Appeals issued the mandate October 3, 1978.
13. Mr. Perlmutter was a widower with adult children.
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respirator and Mr. Perlmutter removed the tube from his throat.14 Mr.
Perlmutter died forty hours later. 5
The state appealed the district court decision to the Florida Supreme Court." On January 17, 1980, the Florida Supreme Court unanimously upheld the right of a competent, but terminally ill adult, who
has no minor dependents and who has unanimous family approval,
to
7
refuse the artificial prolongation of his life and die with dignity.
The initial suit, filed in Broward County Circuit Court by Abe
Perlmutter, named a hospital, two physicians, and the State of Florida
as defendants. 8 In his suit, Mr. Perlmutter asserted that he had the
constitutional right to make the decision to terminate the use of lifeprolonging medical treatment. 9 The defendants denied Mr. Perlmutter's asserted right to die with dignity, and the state warned of possible
criminal violations of Florida law for anyone assisting in Mr. Perlmutter's effort to terminate the life-prolonging medical treatment."
Judge Ferris, in granting the relief sought by Mr. Perlmutter,
ruled that he could: 1) leave the hospital, or 2) remain, free of the
respirator and 3) that one designated by Mr. Perlmutter to assist in the
removal of the respirator would be without civil and criminal liability.2'
The circuit court relied on the landmark case, In Re Quinlan,22 to hold
that Mr. Perlmutter's constitutional right of privacy included the right
to accept or to refuse artificial life-prolonging medical treatment. 23 The
constitutional right of privacy, in cases where patients wish to decline
life-prolonging medical treatment, was succinctly stated in Quinlan:
"We think that the State's interest contra weakens and the individual's right of privacy grows as the degree of bodily invasion increases
14. Miami Herald, Jan. 18, 1980, § A at 1.
15. Id.
16. This appeal was taken pursuant to FLA. CONST. art. 5, § 3(b)(3).
17. Satz v. Perlmutter, 379 So.2d 359 (Fla. 1980).
18. The suit, case number 78-9747, filed June 8, 1978, named Florida Medical
Center, Inc., Nelson Liss, M.D., Marshall J. Brumer, M.D. and Michael Satz, State
Attorney for Broward County as defendants.
19. 47 Fla. Supp. at 192.
20. Id., FLA. STAT. § 782.08 (1979) - Assisting self-murder - "Every person deliberately assisting another in the commission of self-murder shall be guilty of manslaughter, a felony in the second degree.
21. 47 Fla. Supp. at 194.
22. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. den. 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
23. 47 Fla. Supp. at 193.
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and the prognosis dims. Ultimately there comes a point at which the
individual's rights overcome the State interest." 4
In In Re Quinlan, the New Jersey Supreme Court decided that a
terminally ill young woman, whose life was being artificially prolonged,
could elect to discontinue the extraordinary medical treatment. The
court went further and declared that because Ms. Quinlan was incompetent, a court-appointed guardian could make that decision for her. 2
In distinguishing Perlmutter" from Quinlan,2 Judge Ferris found
that Mr. Perlmutter was conscious and mentally competent28 to make a
decision concerning his medical treatment.29 The judge stated that
neither the judgment of the medical profession nor that of the courts
should be substituted for that of Mr. Perlmutter.30
The court also relied on Superintendent of Belchertown v.
Saikewicz3l in finding that Mr. Perlmutter's decision to refuse further
life-prolonging medical treatment outweighed the state's public policy
considerations.12 In Saikewicz, the court was concerned with an incompetent, terminally ill patient. 33 The Massachusetts court balanced the
right of the individual to refuse medical treatment against the public
policy interests of the state,34 and held that the state's interest was insufficient to overcome the individual's right to refuse life-prolonging
medical treatment. 35
Lastly, the circuit court held that anyone who might assist Mr.
Perlmutter in the removal of his respirator would incur no criminal
24. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, 664.
25. Id.
26. 47 Fla. Supp. 190.
27. 70 N.J. 10.
28. See note 10, supra. This hearing was conducted, in part, to determine Mr.
Perlmutter's competency.
29. 47 Fla. Supp. at 191.
30. Id. at 193.
31. 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977).
32. 47 Fla. Supp. at 193.
33. 370 N.E. 2d 417. Mr. Saikewicz was sixty-seven years old, profoundly retarded, having an I.Q. of 10 and a mental age of approximately thirty-two months. He
was also suffering from an acute leukemic disorder. Id. at 420.
34. Id. at 425. The interests of the state included the preservation of life; protection of the family; maintenance of the integrity of the health care profession; and the
prevention of suicide.
35. Id. at 435.
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liability under Florida law. The court reasoned that death resulting
from the removal of the device would be a natural one, and therefore,
an individual aiding Mr. Perlmutter would not be committing an unlawful act.37 In addition, the court held that anyone assisting Mr. Perlmutter would incur no civil liability. 8
The State of Florida, represented by the State Attorney for Broward County, appealed the trial court's order to the District Court of
Appeal of Florida, Fourth District, emphasizing its obligation to preserve life by enforcing state statutes which prohibit both murder 39 and
manslaughter. The Fourth District Court of Appeal unanimously affirmed the trial court's order. 1
In permitting Abe Perlmutter to end the painful, artificial prolongation of his life, the court relied primarily on the reasoning in
Saikewiczl2 and the line of cases cited therein.43 However, the court in
Perlmutter" stated that the adoption of the reasoning employed in
Saikewiczl" was limited to the specific facts involving a legally competent, but terminally ill adult who had expressed a desire to refuse or
discontinue medical treatment." Judge Letts, writing for the majority,
noted: "The problem is less easy of solution when the patient is incapable of understanding and we, therefore, postpone a crossing of that
more complex bridge until such time as we are required to do so." 47
It should be noted that Saikewicz and the cases relied upon in that
decision concerned patients who were terminally ill or who had refused
medical treatment because of religious considerations. Several of these
patients were also legally incompetent due to profound retardation,
36.

FLA. STAT.

37.
38.

47 Fla. Supp. at 194.
Id.

39.
40.

FLA. STAT.
FLA. STAT.

§ 782.08 (1979).
§ 782.04 (1979).
§ 782.08 (1979).

41. 362 So.2d 161, 164 (1979).
42. Id., citing 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977). See note 33, supra.
43. Id. A few cases cited in Saikewicz include: In Re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355
A.2d 647, cert. den. 429 U.S. 922 (1976); Erickson v. Dilgard, 44 Misc.2d 27, 252
N.Y.S.2d 705, (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1962); In Re Estate of Brooks, 32 111.2d 361, 205
N.E.2d 435 (1965).
44. 362 So.2d 160.
45. 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977).
46. 362 So.2d at 162.
47. Id.
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age, or in an irreversible comatose condition.48 In Saikewicz, the majority determined that the right of the individual to refuse life-prolonging medical treatment must be balanced against important public policy considerations.49 The four public policy considerations include:
1) Interest in the preservation of life;
2) Need to protect innocent third parties;
3) Duty to prevent suicide;
4) Requirement that it maintain the ethical integrity of medical
practice.5"
The Fourth District Court acknowledged the state's interest in the
preservation of life. However, the court found that "where the condition is terminal, the patient's situation wretched, and the continuation
of life temporary and totally artificial," this consideration would be
insufficient to override Abe Perlmutter's desire to die a natural death
with dignity. 5'
The court also found that the state may have an interest in the
protection of the family.5 This interest is based on two considerations:
1) the state's role as parenspatriae in guarding the best interests of the
children; and 2) its desire to prevent family members from becoming
wards of the state. 53 The court pointed out that Mr. Perlmutter and his
family were adults, well aware of the consequences of Mr. Perlmutter's
contemplated action, and that they were all in agreement with his express wish to discontinue his life-support system.54
Mr. Perlmutter's refusal to continue life-prolonging medical treatment would not, according to the court, constitute suicide. 55 In reaching this decision, the court considered Mr. Perlmutter's basic desire to
live without total dependence on artificial life-support, and the fact that
his illness was not self-induced.5" In refusing to classify Mr. Perlmut-

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

370 N.E.2d at 424, 425.
Id. at 425, 435.
Id. at 425.
362 So.2d at 162.
Id.
Friedman at 607.
362 So.2d at 162.
Id. at 163.
Id. at 162, 163.
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ter's contemplated action as suicide, the court distinguished between a
patient choosing to forego medical treatment such as surgery or chemotherapy, and an affirmative act such as disconnecting a life-support
system.5 7 It stated: "[n]otwithstanding, the principle is the same, for in
both instances the hapless but mentally competent victim is choosing
not to avail himself of one of the expensive marvels of medical
science.""s
The court also distinguished between cases which involved court
ordered medical treatment for incompetent patients or minor children," and those cases which have upheld the right of competent adults
to refuse medical treatment.'" The majority agreed that competent
adults had the right to refuse medical treatment, and concluded by noting that ". . . because Abe Perlmutter has a right to refuse treatment
in the first instance, he has a cocomitant right to discontinue it." 1

In considering the threat that the right to refuse medical treatment
may pose to the ethical integrity of the medical profession, the majority in specifically adopting the language of Saikewicz, agreed that the
maintenance of the ethical integrity of the health care profession does
not "... demand that all efforts toward life prolongation be made in all

circumstances. 6 2 The court also recognized that the dying patient is
often in need of comfort rather than treatment, and that the patient's
right to self-determination must co-exist with the interests of the health
care profession. 3 Again, adopting the language of Saikewicz, the court
recognized that the right to bodily integrity, inherent in the doctrines of
informed consent and the right of privacy, is superior to the interests of
the health care profession. 4
After weighing the individual's right to refuse medical treatment
and die a natural death with dignity against the state's public policy
considerations, the Fourth District Court of Appeal concluded:
57.
58.

Id. at 163.
Id.

59.
60.

362 So.2d at 163, n. 1.
Id. at 163, n. 3. It should be noted that of the eight cases listed,

three-Saikewicz, Schiller, and Quinlan-concerned incompetent parties.
61. Id.at 163.
62. Id., citing 370 N.E.2d at 426.
63. 362 So.2d at 162, 370 N.E.2d at 427.
64. Id.
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It is our conclusion, therefore, under the facts before us, that when
these several public policy interests are weighed against the rights of Mr.
Perlmutter, the latter must and should prevail. Abe Perlmutter should be
allowed to make his choice to die with dignity, notwithstanding over a
dozen legislative failures in this state to adopt suitable legislation in this
field. It is all very convenient to insist on continuing Mr. Perlmutter's
life so that there can be no question of foul play, no resulting civil liability and no possible trespass on medical ethics. However, it is quite another matter to do so at the patient's sole expense and against his competent will, thus inflicting never ending physical torture on his body until
the inevitable, but artificially suspended, moment of death. Such a
course of conduct invades the patient's constitutional right of privacy,
removes his freedom of choice and invades his right to self-determine. 5
Although the court determined this issue to be of great public interest, the majority affirmed the trial court's judgment without certifying the question to the Florida Supreme Court for review. 6 Judge Anstead, specially concurring, agreed with the majority opinion, but
stated that this issue was of such significant importance as to warrant
certification to the supreme court for a thorough review."
The Florida Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the decision of
the Fourth District Court of Appeal.68 The supreme court adopted the
district court's opinion as its own ". . . because of the clarity of the
reasoning and articulation of the applicable principles of law contained
in the District Court's opinion.""9 The court did, however, limit its affirmation of the lower court's decision to include only competent, but
terminally ill adults with no minor dependents, who have the unanimous approval of all affected family members. 0
In order to clarify certain policy positions contained in the appeal,
the court addressed the question of which governmental branch, the
legislature or the judiciary, should respond to the issue of death with
dignity for terminally ill patients.71 Due to the complex nature of the
issue, the various interests involved and the need to provide a forum for
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

362 So.2d at 164.
Id.
Id.
379 So.2d 359 (Fla. 1980).
Id. at 360.
Id.
Id.
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the airing of public opinion, the court expressed a preference for legislative action in this area. 2 The preference for a legislative resolution of
this controversial issue does not, however, preclude the courts from responding when ". . . legally protected interests are at stake. ' 73 Justice
Sundberg summarized the court's position by stating: "[L]egislative inaction cannot serve to close the doors of the courtrooms 74of this state to
its citizens who assert cognizable constitutional rights.
The court conceded that there were certain limitations in the judicial resolution" of this complex issue, and until the legislature responds, the courts will continue to balance the public policy consideraill patient to refuse medical
tions against the rights of the terminally
76
basis.
case
by
case
a
on
treatment
In the Perlmutter77 decision, the Florida Supreme Court recognized the constitutional right, with specific limitations, of an individual
to refuse or discontinue extraordinary medical treatment. The decision
was narrowly limited to include only those adults who are competent,
family members
terminally ill, without minor children, and whose
7
unanimously consent to the patient's decision. 1
The strict limitations imposed by the court may seriously hinder
many, if not most, terminally ill patients from exercising their rights to
refuse medical treatment. This constitutional right may be restricted
because many terminally ill patients will fail to meet what may be
termed the stringent Five-Prong Perlmutter test. 79 Other courts that
have grappled with this difficult and controversial issue have expanded
this constitutional right to allow all terminally ill patients, regardless of
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. The courts generally require a great deal of time to resolve an issue and
occasionally fail to resolve some issues. There is also an increased strain on the emo-

tional and financial resources of the family.
76.
77.

379 So.2d 359, 361 (Fla. 1980).
379 So.2d 359 (Fla. 1980).

78. Id. at 360.
79.
1)
2)
3)

Id. In order to meet the Five-Prong test, the patient must be:
an adult
legally competent
terminally ill

4) without minor dependents
5) able to obtain the unanimous consent of affected family members.
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competency, to die with dignity."0 This expanded right may be subject,
however, to the general public policy considerations in Saikewicz.8
The Perlmutte82 decision poses an ominous threat to those op-

posed to death with dignity. Some opponents claim that this and other
similar decisions constitute an "opening wedge" 3 that will imperil the
sanctity and preservation of life. This theory rests on the proposition
that certain factions within society would begin with the elimination of
terminally ill patients and eventually include elderly citizens and severely deformed children. 4
As the court pointed out, there are distinct limitations on the abil-

ity of the judicial system to adequately resolve problems in the area of
death with dignity. s5 Resolving the problems of the terminally ill who
wish to refuse medical treatment on a case by case basis may result in
an additional burden on an already overburdened court system. This
additional litigation could involve enormous amounts of time and ex80. The following cases illustrate the expansion of the right to die with dignity by
allowing third parties to order the termination of medical treatment for incompetent,
terminally ill patients: In Re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A. 2d 647, cert. den. 429 U.S.
922 (1976). See text accompanying notes 24, 25 supra. Superintendent of Belchertown
v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E. 2d 417 (Mass. 1977). See note 33 supra. In Dockery v. Dockery, No. 51439 (Chattanooga, Tenn. Chancery Ct., Part 2, filed Jan. 5, 1977), the
court allowed the husband of a comatose (incompetent) patient to order the removal
of her respirator, despite the fact that the patient had consented to the use of the
respirator before becoming incompetent. In In Re Eichner, No. 21242-4-79 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Dec. 12, 1979), affd - N.Y.S. - (App. Div. March 27, 1980). The court
ruled, in New York's first right to die case, that a respirator could be removed from an
imcompetent, eighty-three year old Roman Catholic priest. The decision was based not
on the express approval of the patient, but partially upon statements he had made in
the past concerning the Quinlan decision. In Oharek v. Orlando Regional Medical
Center, 79-1653 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Oct. 9, 1979), a circuit judge in Orlando ruled that
the son of an incompetent, seventy-one year old man suffering from severe, irreversible
brain damage could, as guardian for his father, order the cessation of "heroic" medical
procedures. According to the judge's order, extraordinary measures of life support
included respirators, antibiotics, or other drugs.
81. 370 N.E. 2d 417. See note 34, supra.
82. 379 So.2d 359 (Fla. 1980).
83. Kamisar, Euthanasia Legislation: Some Non-Religious Views Against
Proposed Mercy-Killing Legislation, 42 MINN. L. REv. 969, 1030 (1958).
84. Friedman at 604-606.
85. 379 So.2d 359, 360 (Fla. 1980).
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pense for all concerned parties. Also, the imprecise language used8 in
the decision may produce uncertainty and lead to future litigation. 1
Finally, the problems created by requests for death with dignity
are broad questions of public policy which should and must be resolved
by the legislature: "While it is true that legislative inaction has created

a vacuum in this difficult area of the law, the ability of the judiciary to
fill the void should be seriously questioned." 7 This decision places the
responsibility for resolving the problems associated with death with
dignity back to the legislature, where it belongs.
Ten states have enacted death with dignity legislation. This legislation establishes guidelines for the patient, family, and medical profession to follow when a terminally ill patient elects to discontinue medical treatment."8 Existing death with dignity legislation is not a panacea

86. E.g., the court never defined such basic terms as "terminally ill," "extraordinary medical treatment," "competent," and "family members".
87. W. Hyland, In Re Quinlan: A Synopsis of Law and Medical Technology, 8
RUTGERS

L. J. 37, 58 (1976).

88. The state statutes generally provide guidelines whereby an individual may
elect to refuse extraordinary medical treatment. Included in the guidelines are forms to
be followed by qualified individuals (qualifications are specified in each statute). The
form an individual uses to make his wishes known and legally recognized is called a
directive or living will. Also included in the statutes are provisions for the protection of
the health care profession from civil and criminal liability; procedures for the execution
and revocation of the directive; penalties for the concealment, falsification, or destruction of the document; and definitions of statutory terms.
The following state statutes, together with selected requirements of each law, are
listed in the chronological order of their enactment:
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7185-7195 (Deering Supp. 1979) - California's
Natural Death Act, enacted in 1976, was the first statute to recognize an individual's
right to die with dignity. The statute, while acknowledging this right, provides more
stringent procedural safeguards than most other death with dignity statutes. These include the requirements that: 1) a directive be executed at least fourteen days after an
individual has been diagnosed as terminally ill; 2) two physicians must certify that the
patient is terminally ill; 3) a physician must determine the validity of the directive; and
4) a "patient advocate" designated by the state must witness a directive executed by an
individual in a nursing home. Other statutory safeguards include: 1) the invalidity of
the directive during a patient's pregnancy; 2) penalties for physicians who do not comply with the statute; and 3) the requirement that a directive be re-executed every five
years.
IDAHO CODE § 39-4501 to 4508 (Supp. 1979)-This 1977 statute is similar to California's statute. The individual must be terminally ill, but the diagnosis may be made
by only one physician. The terminally ill patient must be able to communicate with the

Published by NSUWorks, 1980

11

1 268

Nova
Journal
NovaLaw
Law Review,
Vol. 4, Iss. 1 [1980], Art. 11

4:1980

1

for problems associated with death with dignity, but it does offer a
W

doctor, and there is no requirement that a patient execute the directive fourteen days
after being diagnosed as terminally ill. Also, the directive is invalid during a patient's
pregnancy.
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-3801 to 3804 (Supp. 1979)-Arkansas' statute, enacted in
1977, is the briefest, but most comprehensive statute enacted to date. This statute does
not provide a specific form to follow when preparing a directive, procedures for revoking a directive, or penalties for tampering with a document. It does contain a provision
which allows a directive to be executed on behalf of an individual who is physically or
mentally incompetent. This statute is unique because it includes a provision which allows an individual to request that extraordinary life-prolonging procedures be
employed.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 12-35-1 to 35-11 (1977)-This 1977 statute allows a directive
to be executed on behalf of a terminally ill minor by family members or guardian. An
individual may execute the document prior to the diagnosis of terminal illness; however, a specific form is not included in the statute. The immunity from civil and criminal liability for health care personnel is not as extensive as in other statutes.
NEV. REV. STAT. § 449.540-690 (1977)-In order to execute a directive, an individual's terminal illness is not required. A physician is not bound by a directive if the
patient is unable to communicate with the attending physician. However, the physician
shall consider the directive along with other factors in reaching his decision.
ORE. REV. STAT. Ch. 211 (1979)-Oregon's 1977 statute requires the directive to
be re-executed every five years. It is invalid unless executed at least fourteen days after
a patient has been diagnosed as having a terminal illness. This statute provides for a
"patient advocate" for nursing home patients, but does not provide for pregnant
patients.
TEX. REV. CIV. CODE ANN. § 4590h (Vernon Supp. 1980)-A directive, executed
in Texas under the 1977 statute, is effective until revoked. An individual must be diagnosed as having a terminal illness prior to executing a document. The physician has the
responsibility for determining the validity of the directive and the patient's mental
competency.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-320-323 (Supp. 1979)-This 1977 statute combines the
usual right to die provisions with those setting forth the definition of brain death. The
statute provides, subject to specific conditions, procedures for the termination of extraordinary medical treatment in the absence of a declaration. The declaration must be
proved by a clerk of the court or notary public.
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. Ch. 112 (Supp. 1979)-This statute requires the physician to determine the validity of the directive. The directive is required to be placed in
the patient's medical file. The document is void during a patient's pregnancy.
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-28, 101 to 28,109 (Supp. 1979)-This is the most recent
right to die statute to be enacted. Under the statute, physicians are liable for charges of
unprofessional conduct for failing to abide by the statute. The declarant has the responsibility of notifying the physician of the existence of the document.
The relative success of the existing death with dignity legislation (a total absence
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reasonable and practical solution to a complex problem.
It is the responsibility of the legislature to respond to this complex
social issue in a manner that will meet the needs of all of the citizens. 9
Death with dignity legislation has been proposed in the Florida Legislature every year since 1968.11 It is time, especially in light of the Perlmutter decision, for Florida legislators to shoulder their responsibility.
Michael T. Hand
F. Brandon Chapman

of litigation and no reported abuse) has had a significant impact on legislators in other
states. In 1979, bills were introduced in eighteen additional state legislatures. It would
appear that the chances, in the 1980's, are excellent for the enactment of additional
death with dignity legislation. "News from Society for the Right to Die", New RightTo-Die Laws Influence Medical Treatment of Dying Patients, at 1, 2 (April, 1979)
(Press Release).
89. Fort Lauderdale News and Sun-Sentinel, Jan. 20, 1980.
90. Sun-Sentinel (Fort Lauderdale, Fla.), Jan. 18, 1980, § A at 14. It is of interest to note that the first bill was proposed by Walter Sackett, a Miami doctor and
former state legislator.
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